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Abstract (250 words) 
 
Since the global financial crisis of 2007/8, proliferating calls for a Keynesian Green New Deal have 
cast the publicly (and environmentally) minded state as a necessary driver of technological innovation 
and social transformation, while, vice versa, innovation has moved to political centre-stage. The history 
and genesis of this particular Green Keynesian paradigm illustrates that some of its most high-profile 
proponents selectively and problematically frame 20
th
 century Keynesianism and the ‘public good’. It 
is important to examine critically the calls for an ‘entrepreneurial state’ in which Green Keynesian 
ideas are mobilized in support of an agenda for continued and accelerated development of 
commercially-focused, privately-developed green technologies. The entrepreneurial state represents a 
neoliberal re-appropriation of Green Keynesianism, where dominant financial actors (in Silicon Valley, 
as opposed to on Wall Street) are tapped as the visionaries who can and should set our collective 
innovation agenda. Although there is a need for large-scale, coordinated techno-social efforts to 
address climate change, supporting ‘green’ innovation cannot simply be framed as maximizing 
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‘innovation’ while taking the ‘state’ for granted. Instead, it must entail a careful assessment of the 
specific trajectories of innovation being enabled and the underlying socio-natures that they maintain 
and promote. STS-informed analysis allows, and compels, asking how socio-technological innovation 
and their constitutive power relations are crucially interrelated, making the reshaping of the state – still 
the primary institution and system of social relations of collective governance – a core but neglected 
political, technological and ecological project of our time, with a key role for STS. 
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 Arguments about ‘avoiding’ climate change are increasingly problematic and politically 
fraught. Alongside contemporaneous fears of secular stagnation (Teulings & Baldwin, 2014), a wide 
range of proposals have called for massive programs of state-supported green innovation, meant to 
revive economic growth while resolving the problems of environmental decline and social inequity 
bequeathed by an era of neoliberal dominance. This position, referred to herein as ‘Green 
Keynesianism’, interprets the crises of neoliberalism, including economic malaise and financial crisis, 
as an opening for a more economically-active state to re-assert itself in fostering industrial, social and 
technological advance for the public good.   
 Green Keynesianism became popular in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/8. Over the 
ensuing years a range of proposals have deployed the idea of a Green New Deal to historically situate – 
and legitimize – the transformation of national and global economies. As part of a broader discourse 
about the “green economy”, proposals range across the political spectrum. There are decidedly left-
wing calls to reign in corporate and industrial excess and rebalance employment, if also perhaps 
working towards a steady state or even shrinking global economy. And there are also more liberal and 
centrist calls to use green stimulus, in terms of both infrastructural and technological development, to 
revive economic growth. This would involve shifting capital’s dynamism away from dirty industries 
predicated on fossil fuel extraction and use, and towards cleaner, greener industries predicated on 
renewable energy and the sustainable use of resources (Bina, 2013).  
 While the election of Donald Trump in the US (and Brexit in the UK) appears to have dimmed 
prospects for any social democratic turn, Green New Deal approaches remain actively promoted within 
this still-neoliberal, albeit increasingly authoritarian, context. Indeed, there is still reason to believe that 
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the technological aspects of some of these proposals will resonate with this new administration and its 
focus on economic and industrial growth by any means possible; for instance, regarding 
geoengineering (Lukacs, 2017) and ‘industrial strategy’ (HMG, 2017) respectively.  This seems to be a 
dimension of Green New Deal proposals that is likely to remain politically salient in the medium term.  
 Our analysis focuses on one specific thread of Green New Deal politics most forcefully 
promoted in the United States. This paradigm, centered on technology and innovation, has been 
developed by the Breakthrough Institute, as well, more recently, by Bill Gates and his Breakthrough 
Energy Coalition. While this particular strain of Green Keynesian cannot stand as a paradigmatic 
example of the entire, diverse, and ever-changing array of proposals falling under the Green New Deal 
banner, it does help reveal a slippage between what Olivia Bina (2013) describes as “almost business as 
usual” and “greening” forms of green economy proposals.  
 Though most Green New Deal (GND) proposals have explicitly social democratic intentions, 
we ask whether it is possible that their shared focus on innovation, competition and entrepreneurial 
dynamism led by the private sector can inadvertently legitimize a strategic renewal of neoliberal 
agendas.  Specifically then, in this paper we ask: how do these Green New Deal discourses link 
environmental sustainability to innovation and growth within the framework of the entrepreneurial 
state? What are the consequences of this framing for trajectories of innovation, political ecology, 
political economy and the very meaning of the ‘entrepreneurial’ state itself?  
 Green Keynesian proposals generally advocate for a strong state role in innovation that is meant 
to deliver a rebalancing of public vs. private forces, mitigating some of neoliberal capitalism’s most 
environmentally disruptive effects. However, the long term impacts and potentially self-defeating 
implications of these sociotechnical trajectories often go under-examined. There is a seeming refusal to 
interrogate both the ecologically devastating effects of actual, historical Keynesian developmentalism 
as well as the many ways that the past half-century of neoliberalism has transformed both the state – 
which is being embraced as a potential ecological savior – and the socio-political relations of 
innovation that it is supposed to direct. This occurs, we argue, through a limited understanding of 
Keynesianism, presented in binary opposition to an equally simplified conception of neoliberalism, 
along with an uncritical endorsement of the currently dominant model of ‘green’ or ‘clean’ 
technological innovations coming out of privately funded entrepreneurialism.  
 This paper is divided into three sections. First, we review our theoretical orientation, a cultural 
political economy of research & innovation (CPERI, Tyfield 2012)  that explores co-produced systems 
of power relations, including states, and socio-technical innovation. This relational approach to science 
and technology studies (STS) illuminates the dynamic and complex mutual shaping of politics and 
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innovation in ways that go beyond Keynesian - or Polanyian (Cf Bina 2013) - accounts. From this 
perspective we introduce key examples of Green Keynesianism and an overview of the history and 
genesis of these ideas.  
 Second, we explore one specific variant of Green Keynesianism that advocates for an 
‘entrepreneurial state’ which can inject patient capital into the innovation of clean and green 
technologies. With calls for an ‘entrepreneurial state’, incumbent political actors are able to use Green 
Keynesian discourses to push an agenda for continued and accelerated development of commercially-
focused, privately-developed green technologies. This variant of Green Keynesianism shifts away from 
a neoliberal frame that idealizes markets and demonizes states towards a new frame that idealizes 
innovation and demonizes wasteful (dirty and speculative) capital, all while remaining faithful to the 
pre-eminence of markets. In the final section, we discuss the need for a politics of innovation suitable 
for the Anthropocene that profoundly reframes the relations between state and innovation.  
 
A Cultural Political Economy of Research and Innovation in the Green Economy  
 
 In a thorough review of green economy literature, Olivia Bina (2013) distinguishes between 
three broad paradigms. At one extreme are “almost business as usual” proposals, most often put forth 
by government and financial elites. At the other extreme are “all change” proposals, advocated for by 
academics and representatives of civil society. And in between these two lies a category of “greening” 
most often put forth by international agencies and some of the more environmentally conscientious 
governing institutions. Green New Deal proposals largely fall in this middle category, as an attempt to 
advocate for significant social and ecological transformations without going so far as to demand total 
systemic (political and economic) change; ‘fixing’ instead of ‘shifting’ dominant socioeconomic 
paradigms (p.1023). This is far from a clean typology. As Bina notes, the greening proposals are 
“pulled in opposite directions” (p.1034), sometimes towards the ‘all change’ category, and other times 
towards the ‘almost business as usual’ side of things.   
 This spectrum appears to offer a green incarnation of the familiar Left dualism pitting a politics 
of reform (of a now rampant capitalism) against one of revolution (rejecting capitalism wholesale). In 
fact, this framing is explicitly adopted by many Green New Deal proponents, who then reject the latter 
in favor of the more politically ‘realistic’ former. Bina puts a good deal of emphasis on the ways in 
which this middle paradigm can and often is pulled towards the left – towards visions of total systemic 
transformation and radical social democracy. In what follows, we instead focus on the ways this middle 
paradigm – specifically Green New Deal proposals – can be and often is pulled towards the right. This 
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would leave these proposals inextricably entangled with aspects of the ‘business as usual’ paradigm 
that may in fact be antithetical to their stated social and environmental aims.  
 In this shift of focus we highlight not just the socio-economic issues of state capture highlighted 
by Bina. Rather, in taking an STS approach, our lens explores the transformation of innovation itself by 
specific political projects and agendas, and the reciprocal implications of that transformation for further 
shaping of the state, in iterative and never-ending feedback loops.  As previous literature illustrates, 
STS has much to offer regarding our understanding of innovation. For example, Benoît Godin (2006) 
puts the concept and practices of innovation in historical perspective, unearthing the complexity of this 
process and critically challenging prevailing linear models of innovation.  More generally, an STS 
perspective unpacks innovation as a complex, multi-agent process of introducing novel heterogeneous 
assemblages of human, machinic and vital matter that constitute a changing hybrid ‘socio-technical’ 
reality (e.g. Law, 1991; Latour 2005)  
 In order to understand how innovation fits into broader circuits of economic and political 
relations, we orient our approach to these core STS questions around a cultural political economy of 
research and innovation (CPERI). This approach explores the co-production (Jasanoff 2004) of R&I 
and socio-political regimes (e.g. neoliberalism) in terms of dynamic systems of power/knowledge 
relations and technologies (Tyfield 2015). Alongside earlier STS perspectives on socio-technical 
change, therefore, this CPERI approach draws together cultural political economy (CPE) (Jessop & 
Sum, 2006; Jessop, 2012), political ecology (Lawhon & Murphy, 2013), theories of socio-technical 
systems transition (Smith et al., 2010) and a Foucauldian analysis of government regarding the 
‘conduct of conduct’ of polities and selves (Dean, 2010; Lemke, 2011), while focusing specifically on 
issues of research and innovation (Mirowski & Sent, 2008; Mirowski 2011, 2013; Tyfield, 2012).  
 The CPERI approach has the potential to address two key aspects of societal transformations 
imagined and promoted by Green Keynesianism. First, it addresses the way in which STS (and 
innovation studies) has tended to downplay issues of (capitalist) political economy (Tyfield et al. 2017) 
and to under-examine issues of power and the systemic dynamics conditioning R&I (see also Avelino 
& Rotmans 2009; Schneider & Lösch, 2016).  Here CPERI goes beyond contemporary common-sense 
understandings of power as a zero-sum and brute capacity held by the powerful over the powerless. 
Instead, it builds upon Foucault’s discussion of power, or power/knowledge, as dispersed, ubiquitous, 
strategic, relational and productive, both of emergent systems of government and individual 
subjectivities (Foucault, 2001; Hindess, 2006).  
 Shifting from a structural account of power, as something possessed by some over others, to a 
relational and constitutive conception complicates concepts of system ‘lock-in’ and transition (Garvey 
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et al., 2015 Cf Unruh, 2000; Geels, 2014). This, in turn, leaves open possibilities to explore (and 
perhaps assist) emergent, alternative regimes of socio-technical change. A CPERI perspective thus not 
only illuminates (possibly changing) system dynamics of innovation-as-politics; it also exposes the 
strategically self-defeating inadequacies of approaches that fail to grapple with the complex, dynamic 
and inseparable co-production of socio-technical and socio-political change.  
 Second, a CPERI approach addresses the key aspects of STS and related scholarship on 
environmental change, which shows how environmental change is inextricably interwoven with socio-
technical change, creating ‘socio-natures’ (Castree & Braun, 2001; Lawhon and Murphy, 2012; also 
Huber, 2013). Accordingly, our CPERI approach provides a way to analyse capitalism as a nature-
making process, in line with Jason W. Moore’s (2015) arguments, in order to understand how different 
regimes within the history of capitalism (such as mid-20
th
 century Keynesianism or ongoing 
neoliberalism) shape and transform, in distinct ways, specific socio-natures. For example, Matthew 
Huber (2013) illustrates the entwining of oil, capitalism, and environmental degradation in 20
th
 century 
American capitalism and life (also see Mitchell, 2011; Urry, 2014). It should be clear then that we 
regard the social relations of capitalism, whether in neoliberal or Keynesian form, as a profound driver 
of anthropogenic climate change (Brand & Wissen 2013; Mann, 2015).  
 It is certainly the case that humankind has been transforming its environment since the dawn of 
organized social relations. Yet it is only with this most recent period of nature- and world-making, 
coinciding with the expansion of colonization and capitalism on a world scale, that (some) human 
activities have been able to transform the planetary climatological system in dangerous and 
unpredictable ways. Instead of pitting reform against revolution, as in the Green Keynesian framing, 
we attempt to work strategically with the sociotechnical and environmental complexities of ‘doing 
politics’ in the toxic wake of ‘late industrialism’ (Fortun, 2012).  
 With this in mind, we now turn to our analysis of Green Keynesianism and its complicated 
relationship with the neoliberal present from which it purports to offer respite and relief. 
 
Green Keynesianism after the Financial Crisis  
 
 Over the last decade of post-Great Financial Crash neoliberal revanchism, with states 
profoundly beholden to financialized capital and a faith in free markets, Green Keynesianism has 
increasingly been presented as a much needed reprieve. The logic is not hard to understand; if 
unencumbered free markets and the financial flows that they support (a.k.a. “Wall Street”) are the 
problem, then perhaps reining in these flows and embedding them within a strong, state-supported 
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regime of environmentally-conscious accumulation could offer a solution (Cf Barnes, 2006; Brown, 
2011). Green Keynesianism is not just about ‘regulating’ financial flows, but also centrally implies the 
ability of the state to provide direct infrastructural and material support to the economy, to ‘prime the 
pump’ with initiatives meant to support the public good. For Keynesian policies this has historically 
meant job creation, public infrastructure development, and regulations intended to empower labor and 
to restrain employers. So why not extend these ideas into the present: green jobs, green infrastructure, 
tougher environmental regulations and stronger pollution controls?  
 Green New Deal (GND) discourses gained steam in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. With 
massive state bailouts required to save a financial sector that was ‘too big to fail’ the stage was set to 
explore the different types of active roles that states could and should play in the global economy 
(Knuth, 2014).  For example, in 2008 the New Economics Foundation (2008) convened the Green New 
Deal Group (comprised of economists, journalists and environmentalists) and produced a 
comprehensive report outlining their proposed response to the dual financial and ecological crises. 
Central to their proposal, and to most subsequent GND proposals, was an ambitious plan of state-led 
investment into renewable energy and conservation technologies. Restraining and disciplining 
speculative finance capital was married to support for infrastructural development (project financing) 
and new technology development (venture capital), all with the aim of shifting investment back 
towards the productive economy.  
 Other examples of GND proposals included UNEP’s Global Green New Deal (2009), which 
stated that it was fully committed to a model of green growth driven by “accelerated investment in a 
renewable energy future.” UNEP estimated that US$100 Billion of additional investment per year over 
15 years in renewable energy technologies should be sufficient to scale up the industry and drop the 
price of renewable energy to a sufficiently low point where “private investment crowds in” and state 
support is no longer necessary. Similarly, various scientists and CEOs proposed massive state-
supported cleantech initiatives – for some a green ‘Manhattan project’, for others letting ‘1000 
innovators bloom’ (King & Layard, 2013; Oreskes, 2013). And, finally, the Breakthrough Institute 
advocated for the creation of a Clean Energy Deployment Administration (CEDA) through which state 
support for early stage green innovation could be coordinated (Jenkins and Mansur, 2011). 
 In each of these proposals and others like them, support for the development of renewable 
energy technology was targeted as a primary means of societal transition. For example, Edenhofer and 
Stern (2009) argued for the support of green financing as a central concern. They proposed a number of 
mechanisms meant to stimulate green innovation such as feed-in tariffs, renewable portfolio standards, 
tax credits and loan guarantees. Moreover, they suggested that G20 nation-states “should establish 
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publicly financed venture capital funds that target innovative clean-energy technologies and develop a 
G20 Strategic Energy Technology Plan” (p.5). As they go on to explain, such state-backed venture 
capital would be able to take a more patient (and less risk-averse) approach than typical private venture 
funds, adding social and ecological goals to the need to realize adequate returns.  
 These are only a few examples of the broad range of GND proposals that present more or less 
middle road, status-quo affirming plans. In the next section we narrow our focus to one particular 
variant of GND proposal predicated upon the promotion of an “entrepreneurial state.”   
 
The Entrepreneurial State  
 
Over the last few years the ‘entrepreneurial state’ has attained a lot of interest and high-profile 
media coverage.  While there is very little to show for it in terms of meaningful effect on policy and 
political outcomes, at least in terms of any Green New Deal that it expressly advocates, we argue that 
this discourse recuperates Green Keynesian ideas by legitimizing both neoliberal conceptions of the 
state and approaches to innovation. By ‘entrepreneurial state’ we refer to two distinct positions; those 
of Mariana Mazzucato in Europe and those of the Breakthrough Institute in the USA. For Mazzucato 
(2011, 2016), who coined the phrase, the entrepreneurial state emerges from a Schumpeter-inspired 
approach that conceptualizes the innovation process as highly uncertain and open-ended and thus 
dependent on risk-taking agency and institutions.  
Conventional common-sense today would identify these entrepreneurial agencies with the 
specialized capacities and resources of competitive private venture finance, in contrast to states that are 
shown to be terrible at ‘picking winners’. Mazzucato argues that this is a grievous misreading of both 
theory and the historical record, instead offering a powerful critique of the neoliberal innovation 
system, its financialisation, short-termism, and more recent commitment to fiscal austerity. Conversely, 
she argues, it is quintessentially the state, and only the state, that has taken and can continue to take on 
the large, shot-in-the-dark risks of constructing entirely new systems and radical innovations that 
promise significant public benefit.  
 Mazzucato argues against neoliberal common-sense portrayals of the state as a lumbering 
dinosaur in opposition to fast-evolving, nimble venture financiers. Instead, she positions the 
entrepreneurial state as a lion of innovation, to be compared with the posturing pussycats of private 
finance who will only bet on a sure thing once the state has supported the initial work. Considering the 
argument that profound public-good innovation is needed to address the current predicament of 
economic stagnation and ecological risk, it follows that the state alone can, and so must, stimulate 
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institutional, economic and technological change that will not otherwise happen. Bill Gates has been 
intrigued with Mazzucato’s work, explaining in a recent interview his somewhat hesitant endorsement 
of active state involvement in the promotion of green technologies (Bennet, 2015) as a least-worst 
option.  
The US-based Breakthrough Institute, founded in 2003 by Michael Shellenberger and Ted 
Nordhaus, offers a similarly revived appreciation of the state’s active role in promoting green 
innovation. Their work highlights the ongoing role that state-funded research and innovation has played 
in the field of energy research (Shellenberger et al., 2012), arguing that the state will continue to be 
essential to ongoing industrial innovation. Any new green economy will therefore have to entail a state 
actively committed to funding the right, green technologies that can transform modern society in 
environmentally beneficial ways. In their most recent publication (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015), we learn 
that these ‘right’ ways consist primarily of advanced solar technology and continued development of 
nuclear power. 
Self-proclaimed eco-modernists and champions of technological innovation, they are quick to 
point out the central role that state funding has played in the development of previous technological 
breakthroughs such as hydraulic fracturing (Shellenberger et al., 2012). While “reject[ing] the planning 
fallacy of the 1950s”, they advocate the development of green industrial policies meant to direct 
innovation and industrial advance (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015, pp.29-30). Though they have moved 
beyond their proposal for the creation of the aforementioned CEDA, which would function as a central 
government funding agency that could provide financial support to early-stage technology companies, 
they remain committed to the centrality and necessity of state support for ‘breakthrough’ environmental 
technologies.   
 Breakthrough differs with Mazzucato in the relative emphasis placed upon the state as a creator 
of industrial policy. For Mazzucato the state can and should steer the private sector towards its own, 
publicly-determined sense of what technologies are in the public good. The Breakthrough Institute, 
conversely, is more inclined to see the state as a willing and largely unquestioning facilitator of 
innovation agendas already underway in the private sphere. The state is meant to provide patient capital 
that can help de-risk new technologies as a non-diluting investor in the earliest stages of development. 
This will allow these innovations the time and (tax-funded) resources to become viable investments for 
the private venture capital industry eventually to fund, once the riskiest stages of development have 
passed.  
Hence, we might say that where Mazzucato offers a scathing (and compelling) indictment of the 
risk-averse nature of venture capital and the innovation agenda that forms around (and despite) it, the 
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Breakthrough Institute sees this risk-aversion as a market-failure for the state to correct.  The state can 
do so by facilitating and strengthening the venture-capital dominated innovation agenda with targeted 
grants, loan guarantees and other transfers of public wealth into private commercial applications. For 
them, the entrepreneurial state is thus actually envisioned as a venture financing state (Cf Janeway, 
2012).   
 We see in both these positions a subtle shift, where visions of a transformed economy form 
around the risk-taking state.  This state can focus on the twin public goods of mitigating ecological 
change as a new and crucial techno-social domain, as well as the innovation risk that prevents venture 
investors from entering into the funding of new technologies. Yet neither of these visions questions 
how the entrepreneurial state resonates with, and so enables, important and relatively painless shifts in 
a strategically dominant neoliberal positioning. This concerns a neoliberalism reconstituted in the wake 
of disorientation from the Great Financial Crisis and compelled to respond to the growing weight of 
evidence regarding ecological destruction.  
Looking at this from a CPERI perspective that considers innovation-as-politics can help reveal 
the limitations of this approach (Tyfield, 2012; Tyfield et al., 2017). For a generation or more, 
neoliberalism’s boosters have told us that the market is the most important social coordinating 
mechanism, and therefore it should be embraced at all levels and in all dimensions of social life, 
including the state. Yet markets have spectacularly failed in recent years, most obviously – e.g. in 
ongoing dependence on QE stimulus – for the very financialized power blocs that were previously 
neoliberalism’s most ardent and enabled supporters. Waiting in the wings of this justificatory schema 
and political project, however, the figure of the entrepreneur is imagined as an agent ready to combat 
these market failures and help realize the market’s optimal (and optimally productive) socio-political 
order.  
Neoliberal common-sense – and, indeed, neoliberal socio-technical change itself – has 
sedimented innovation and entrepreneurialism as unquestionable, self-evident goods (Szeman, 2015).  
Innovation becomes an individualized but also Promethean world-creating power mediated and 
rewarded by the market, although the political currency of the latter has become increasingly tarnished. 
In this context, accepting the seriousness of contemporary ecological challenges makes ‘innovation’ 
seem unarguably both necessary and urgent, and the figure of the entrepreneur is heralded accordingly, 
as society’s savior. 
 These trends come together in a discursive shift, away from markets and towards innovation as 
a central organizing and justificatory concept (see e.g. Economist, 2015). The overwhelming appeal 
and strategic enablement of this move, however, is that the latter does not negate, but actually has the 
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power to re-situate and re-legitimize, the former. The entrepreneurial state is thus envisioned as an 
innovator, and the definition of innovation as venture capital-led private sector entrepreneurship 
remains hegemonic and unqualified. It is both in support of this capacity to innovate – thus defined – 
and upon the condition that the state itself is opened up and subjected to renewal by way of the superior 
stewardship of entrepreneurial change-agents that ‘bringing the state back in’ attains its new 
justificatory significance.  
 Building on a CPERI approach, we would argue that for neoliberalism “nothing proves that the 
market economy is intrinsically defective since everything attributed to it as defect and as the effect of 
its defectiveness should really be attributed to the state” (Foucault, 2008, p.116). Hence the market 
serves as a neoliberal fantasy or apotheosis that sutures the gap between real and symbolic orders 
(Dean, 2008), providing a non-falsifiable (political) argument. And the flipside is to scapegoat the 
(implicitly Keynesian, planning) state as the source of all imperfections and a permanent fetter upon 
realizing the ideal form of a market-based society.  
With the entrepreneurial state, by contrast, we see a new ideology emerging that scapegoats 
‘dirty’, corrupt, corporate capital and industrial polluters, along with the parasitic and unproductive 
financiers and the ‘Big Government’ (to whom they are connected by fast-revolving doors) supporting 
them. The entrepreneurial state instead empowers clean, productive, entrepreneurial innovators (who 
are still capitalists), enabling this new group of industrial (now high-technological) actors by entrusting 
them with the unique powers of the state. 
 Of course, the idea of ‘Silicon Valley’, and its implicit contrast with ‘Wall Street’, – which we 
understand through this CPERI lens to be simultaneously locations, networks, and political-economic 
imaginaries (Jasanoff, 2004) – is crucial to this picture, and not just in the US. Silicon Valley’s 
message is enticing, and strikingly resonant with the message of Green Keynesianism. In this sense, 
entrepreneurs are framed as the social actors who can innovate a way out of the problems incubated by 
Wall Street, so long as the state funds and empowers their efforts.
 
For an example of this hubris, see 
Goldstein (2013). 
In other words, the entrepreneurial state - or really the venture capital state - becomes a 
seemingly radical alternative to the Wall Street-backed, status quo neoliberal state.  Instead of “the 
market can’t be wrong” and a political project of market fundamentalism we have “Technology can’t 
be wrong” as part of a broad project of technological salvation, or ‘disruption’ (Morozov, 2014; Keen, 
2015).  Furthermore, instead of the state as political whipping boy, we have the new unconscionable 
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vice of neo-Luddism, accused of objections to, calls for regulation of, or caution regarding any and all 
‘disruptive’ technologies.1 This explains the Breakthrough Institute’s admonishment of left 
environmentalism, which has, in their assessment, taken on precisely this sort of anti-technological, and 
therefore politically moribund, position (Shellenberger & Nordhaus, 2004).  
Technology has and will continue to play a central defining role in the production and 
reproduction of global societies, and questions of technology will always be essential to climate 
politics. However, the use of the term ‘technology’ is problematic in Green Keynesianism. It allows 
them to slip into an uncritical and wholesale endorsement of a very specific, venture capital- (and 
military-) funded understanding of technology and the innovation agenda underwriting it. And it thus 
avoids political questions about what is considered to be desirable technological innovation in the first 
place. Any inkling of a return to debates around appropriate technologies – more often today 
understood through concepts such as degrowth, just transitions, diverse economies or buen vivir – are 
dismissed for not providing wholesale endorsement of the specific technological agenda currently 
promoted by venture capital-funded entrepreneurs, the self-anointed masters of innovation.
2
  
By contrast, CPERI highlights that this is but one specific and situated model of innovation. 
Instead of showing technology and innovation to be an ethical, political and historically complex 
terrain of social creativity, their far narrower discussion of green technology reflects the current 
trajectories of commercial viability and its focus on alternative energy production; as opposed, for 
instance, to challenging unequal and unsustainable patterns of energy use. An unquestioned notion of 
market sovereignty comes to be embedded within a naturalized conception of what technology is and 
what innovation can, and cannot, become. As such, this entrepreneurial techno-politics squanders the 
opportunity to acknowledge, as many STS scholars have convincingly shown, that the process and 
trajectory of innovation itself, and not just its funding, is an essential terrain of political and ecological 
struggle (Tyfield et al, 2017).   
Returning to Bina’s typology, the notion of the entrepreneurial state is different from proposed 
policy frameworks that can actively shape investment and innovation in the green economy, and which 
take a Polanyian perspective that seeks to re-embed the economy within an invigorated social and 
                                                        
1For a graphic illustration of the current political purchase and work being done by the concept of ‘innovation’ in the 
EU, for example, see the attempted propagation by several trans-national chemicals corporations of a so-called 
‘Innovation Principle’, designed to rival the ‘Precautionary Principle’ as a newly established maxim of EU governance 
where the goal is to protect the ‘innovation environment’ – i.e. of minimal regulatory interference in innovation 
(EPSC 2016, ERF N.D.).. 
2
 This pro-technology perspective is also voiced by the accelerationists (Srnicek and Williams 2015), who castigate 
positions such as degrowth, buen vivir and diverse economies as ‘folk politics’, which operate on too small of a scale to 
actually make an impact. 
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political sphere (Bina, 2013). With the entrepreneurial state, revitalized state direction is primarily set 
in collaboration with venture capital. Innovation trajectories therefore become focused on the needs of 
the market (i.e. financial corporations) as much – if not more – than any public or environmental needs 
that Green Keynesians might be hoping the state would address.  
If the Keynesian state is imagined to have done its de-risking of industrial development for the 
people, this entrepreneurial state will instead do its de-risking for Silicon Valley, as supposed agents of 
Green Keynesian innovation.  Furthermore, in the process it enables this privileged network to shape 
the institutions of the state to their enduring strategic and financial advantage (Morozov, 2015). 
Crucially, therefore, the entrepreneurial state is primarily a project of redefining the state, while taking 
innovation as given, as opposed to revitalizing, redirecting and redefining innovation through a 
publicly-interested state agenda.   
Perhaps the reason for this is that neither Mazzucato nor the Breakthrough Institute’s thinkers 
consider the interaction between processes of innovation and the state as a set of power relationships, 
unlike CPERI (Tyfield, 2012). They have a vision of what the state could become economically, but 
there is no real analysis of what the state already is politically. The same is true with their treatment of 
technology, precluding any possibility that a necessary and just transition may and likely will require a 
radical revisiting of what innovation means, how it is developed, who is empowered to innovate, and, 
reciprocally, who is empowered or disadvantaged by these innovations.  
 With this example we can see how an actually-emerging Green Keynesianism can thus be 
marshalled (more-or-less unwittingly) to support ongoing neoliberal-framed efforts to steer the 
economy in relatively unchanged ways. When underpinned by frameworks like the entrepreneurial 
state, as we will now explore, Green Keynesianism can inadvertently provide justificatory cover for 
neoliberal projects by offering a superficial, populist idealism that flattens out the contours of history 
and pines for a return to simpler and more august days, regulated days, days when finance was kept in 
check and the ‘real’ economy could therefore flourish (e.g. Perez, 2009). The veneer of these golden 
days glistens brighter as the distance between historical fact and present day fantasy widens.   
 
Some Problems with Green Keynesianism  
 
 If, as Geoff Mann (2015) argues, Keynes was primarily concerned with saving civilization from 
the destabilizing effects of capitalism, then Green Keynesian efforts to ‘save the planet’ may actually 
be the most faithfully Keynesian aspect of GND politics. Yet herein lies the crux of the problem: what 
civilization is it that will be saved when so much of the social, environmental and technological 
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infrastructure of this civilized life is deeply embedded in the capitalist world-ecology (Moore 2015) 
that we need saving from? A richer account of Green Keynesianism that addresses the historic relations 
amongst political economy, political ecology and socio-technical change in the actual history of 
Keynesianism can, as we now explore, offer us guidance.  
 Many Green Keynesian proposals overlook how actually-existing Keynesianism was socio-
ecologically and historically situated and unrepeatable (Mann, 2015). It was comprised of a 
constellation of sociopolitical forces including regimes of accumulation, spatio-temporal fixes, 
political-cultural settlements and hegemonic common-senses. Together these constituted the Keynesian 
National Welfare State (Jessop, 2002) that dominated the post-war period in the re-established ‘core’ of 
the global North, and in an age before global environmental challenges were acknowledged. 
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, this Keynesian miracle was inseparable from a massive 
influx of petroleum into the global economy – fueling what Schnaiberg and Gould (1994) termed the 
treadmill of production (Cf Cato, 2013). 
 Most invocations of this Keynesian period focus on state-supported public works and the 
institutional infrastructure of social welfare provisioning. But military and Cold War spending was an 
equally, if not more, central (and certainly larger in terms of total expenditures) aspect of the 20
th
 
century growth model (Pivetti, 1989). Militarism not only led directly to economic activity and 
significant innovation (in the military-industrial complex).   It was also a necessary means of securing 
global access to the material and financial resources upon which first world prosperity was built (e.g. 
Mitchell, 2011; Yergin, 2009).  
 The Cold War provided a social and cultural politics of legitimization for unprecedentedly 
generous state funding in the United States, which could be cast as a defense of the ‘free world’ and 
even more specifically, a defense of a distinctly American way of life predicated upon mass 
consumption. And yet, the intense dependence of the Keynesian settlement, including its public 
provision of science and technology (Mirowski & Sent, 2008), on Cold War military spending is all-
too-easily passed over with allusions to a new Keynesianism that eliminates its dependence on warfare, 
or assumes it can be deployed instead as a civilian “war on climate change” (Rao, 2015). Such hopes 
ignore the actual geopolitical militarization and securitization already underway, including of climate 
change, not least in the US where government officials have explicitly framed climate change as a 
national security threat (see Bonds, 2015; Jackson, 2015). 
At the point of production, the New Deal’s labor-capital accord was a means of ensuring that 
the working class majority forwent labor militancy in exchange for relatively high wages and decent 
workplace protections (Bowles et al., 1986). However, a broader picture needs to consider the ways in 
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which a new form of social reproduction was central to this bargain. Despotism in the workplace was 
met with individuated suburban freedoms in home life, at least for those making good white male 
wages.  
As Matthew Huber (2013) argues, the Keynesian labor-capital accord was a means of using 
public resources to create a landscape of privatized and fossil-fueled wealth. Direct state support for 
mass suburbanization, the production of an interstate highway system, and the rise of consumer credit 
all helped lay the ground – financially, socially and concretely – for the rise of a neoliberal subjectivity, 
where entrepreneurial competition as opposed to market exchange could be seen as the foundational 
pillar of society. This compromise was very much about insuring a petrol-regime over production and 
consumption – cheap oil fueling mass industrial production, and therefore also mass consumer life 
(Urry, 2013; Mitchell, 2011).  
 Petroleum-based products and infrastructure became a ubiquitous, unquestioned dimension of 
everyday life, as oil – the central and defining commodity of the 20th century – flowed through almost 
everything (Urry, 2014). Huber argues that this mode of social reproduction –or what Stephanie 
LeMenager (2014) calls petromodernity and Timothy Mitchell (2011) conceptualized as ‘carbon 
democracy’ – is so thoroughly tethered to the petroleum-based economy that any substantive proposals 
for decarbonization will appear farcical at best, and, at worst, aggressively anti-American affronts to 
the freedoms of mass-consumer life.  
Simply put, the American way of life was not – nor is it now – up for debate. It must be 
preserved (or even made ‘great again’) at all costs. This becomes starkly clear in the U.S. based, 
ecomodernist proposals for GND politics discussed above, which justify their focus on technological 
innovation in light of the recalcitrance (and unquestionable desirability) of mass consumer lifestyles 
and desires. It will be easier to create green cars, for instance, then to wean people off of their use 
(Mowery et al. 2010). 
 More broadly, however, what we see happening with the invocation of Green Keynesianism is a 
split history. On the one hand, the 20
th
 century Keynesian miracle is seen as a product of state 
intervention – whether through warfare or welfare – and Green Keynesians want to see a return to this 
sort of central authority to steer the economy. But on the other hand, there is an inseparable history of 
accelerating climate change over this same period, marked by many of the specific sociotechnical 
assemblages (automobiles, airplanes, suburbia, disposability, etc.) that were being engrained into 
modern industrial life by this very same regime (Huber, 2013; Urry, 2014). To a large extent, this 
Keynesian miracle put in place the sociotechnical conditions for an utterly toxic and unsustainable way 
of life – an infrastructure of waste-making at a planetary scale (Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994).  
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 To the extent that problems with historic Keynesian initiatives and policies are acknowledged 
by many of the more high-profile and influential proponents of a Green New Deal on whom we have 
focused above, they are simply assumed to be analytically distinct and unfortunate side-effects that can 
be rectified by greater care and attention rather than constitutive and deepening systemic dynamics. For 
example, UNEP’s (2009) proposal for a GND does not limit itself to Roosevelt’s New Deal policies as 
its model, but also looks to the Green Revolution, where new agricultural technologies were 
disseminated across the Global South. “Notwithstanding its environmental and social drawbacks,” they 
explain, these technologies spread “from the hands of a few hundred scientists to millions of poor 
farmers… at a breathtaking speed and scale” (pp.15-6). However, instead of rapidly increasing 
agricultural yields in environmentally and socially devastating ways (Thompson & Thompson, 2005), 
they argue that their GND will instead rapidly increase renewable energy yields – in environmentally 
and socially harmonious ways.  
 Ultimately, the idealism and pragmatic political appeal of Green Keynesian proposals such as 
this depend upon maintaining the analytically implausible split between two 20
th
 centuries. In one, a 
strong and virtuous state creates the conditions for the relative affluence of a broad-based (white) 
middle class and its global development agenda; and in another one, a treadmill of production (and 
destruction and warfare) enables this affluence through (post-)colonial dispossessions and the 
accelerated destabilization of world-ecology. In order for Green Keynesianism to remain logically 
coherent and politically compelling, the state (abstractly understood) and its potential to act in securing 
the public interest (socially and now ecologically as well) must be insulated from the realities of its 
sociotechnical infrastructure. How that public interest is defined becomes, therefore, a critical question 
to unpack. 
 
The ‘Public Interest’ Redefined  
 
 Perhaps the most alluring aspect of a return to Keynesianism is the idea that the state will be 
able to function primarily in the public interest, in contrast to an incumbent, globally-dominant and 
environment-destroying neoliberalism. This contrast is crucial to the political appeal of Green 
Keynesianism, as the most important and ready-to-hand foil against which neoliberalism can 
(supposedly) be understood and countered.  However, the supposed self-evidence – and achievability – 
of this familiar sense of the public interest ignores the complex conceptual constellation of public and 
private interests in the Keynesian period, rather than their simple opposition (Mann, 2015). As a 
renewal of liberal capitalism in the wake of two world wars, the defeat of fascism and the continuing 
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threat of socialism, the Keynesian public was mainly prioritized to the extent that it enabled growth of 
private life: a large social sphere incorporating private enterprise, work contracts and the rights to a 
private domestic life that supposedly characterized the ‘Free World’ (Aglietta, 2000).    
 The return to this publicly-minded statecraft is also belied by the unique conjunction of socio-
technical, political economic and cultural conditions that gave the actually-existing Keynesian ‘public’ 
both its specific sense and its broad political purchase. Of particular importance was the dominance of 
industrial (as opposed to financial) capital, built around new horizons of accumulation from the 
expansion of mass consumerism and petrol- and plastic-based innovation (Huber, 2013). Furthermore, 
it was built on a strong working class in the Global North that served as bedrock and guard of the social 
welfare settlement, themselves empowered by the threat of more radical anti-capitalist politics 
sponsored by actually-existing socialism (Jessop, 2002).  The way in which Green Keynesian 
arguments simplify and even fetishize what the Keynesian state was and therefore could become, 
however, crucially depends upon being pitted against an equally simplified, straw man version of the 
neoliberal state that ignores the dynamism and ongoing coordinating capacities of this more recent 
social formation.  Here again a CPERI perspective is helpful for understanding neoliberalism as 
complex dynamic system. 
Conceptually, it is the gravest mistake to misread neoliberalism as a radical preference for the 
market as against the state in the organization and coordination of political economic relations. Rather, 
as an epistemic market fundamentalism, in which the market is conceived as the best of all possible 
decision-makers (Mirowski, 2013), neoliberalism is systematically agnostic regarding the state per se;. 
This is exemplified in the Hayekian debate about the ‘esoteric’ and ‘exoteric’ relations of state and 
citizenry. Indeed, the monopoly of legitimate coercion in the hands of the state is a crucial political tool 
for neoliberalism in the (often heatedly rejected) marketization of all things (Mirowski, 2013).  
More generally, state power is needed for multiple political projects of entrepreneurial and/or 
financialized profit-seeking and for the oversight and regulation of markets. Furthermore, the state 
itself and its functions of public support can be increasingly subjected to forms of (quasi-) market 
discipline. Even in the archetype of the US, the state has never stopped (and indeed has massively 
increased) its support for R&D of commercial technologies (Block, 2008). Yet, this has been conducted 
as a ‘stealth’ industrial policy because the discourse of ‘market vs. state’ has proven a powerful means 
of delegitimizing the incumbent Keynesian consensus from which it emerged (Mirowski & Plehwe, 
2009).  
 The supposed return to the public (vs. private) is no different in this respect, especially when it 
is itself cast in terms of state vs. market. Neoliberal governance has not abandoned the ‘public’, even as 
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it systematically denigrates it in political discourse and demolishes the social welfare institutions 
embodying the Keynesian sense of the public interest (Smart, 2003). Instead, neoliberalism has effected 
a profound transvaluation, in which government’s role in defense of the public is to secure (perhaps 
literally, via accumulation by dispossession) the conditions for unencumbered pursuit of the interest of 
a ‘public’ consisting of shareholders, property owners, (debt-based) consumers and competitive 
entrepreneurs (Crouch, 2011). 
 To counter that this is just not what public really means belies a refusal to admit that one’s 
(perhaps quite legitimate) normative preferences do not trump, in and of themselves, the prevailing 
operative understanding of one’s society and the system of power-knowledge relations through which it 
is constituted. To be clear: we do not deny or underestimate the profound (and in early 2017, manifest) 
political appetite for an alternative to the neoliberal status quo and its impoverished, economically 
uneven conception of the public interest. However, when such criticism falls back upon a simplified 
conception of Keynesianism as the paradigmatic form of not-neoliberalism, it fails to register the 
crucial political and ideological continuity between the two and therefore fails to offer any meaningful, 
strategic and potentially transformative alternative.   
 Sticking to surface dualisms – Keynesianism vs. neoliberalism, public vs. private, state vs. 
market – conditions a largely superficial analysis that envisions discrete regulatory regimes that can 
simply be exchanged at will, as interchangeable and replaceable skins to sheath the state in its 
management and superintendence of the capitalist economy.  In contrast, the CPERI approach we use 
herein provides a means to examine actually-existing social formations and socio-technical models 
which have irrevocably and thoroughly reshaped the social, economic, political and of course 
environmental landscape, not to mention the very nature of what states themselves are and can become. 
We caution against approaches to Green Keynesianism that effectively fetishize the potentially 
developmental state (Cf Song 2013), as the forebear of a virtuous, collectively rational guardian of the 
public interest that temporarily and regretfully lost out to neoliberal greed, but to which deepening 
environmental, economic and political crises will force a return, by way of our collective reason.  
 
Conclusion: Towards an Eco-Politics of Innovation and the State 
 
Many GND proposals offer compelling and what seem to be politically realistic visions of a 
greener world.  Against the continuing torpor of meaningful global action, they also seem quite 
radically ambitious, and we do not doubt that massive state projects of this kind could be greatly 
preferable to the status quo and even necessary (Jessop, 2012). Yet it remains important to see how 
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these supposedly straightforward calls to ‘bring the state back in’ to stimulate (or re-orient) innovation 
are built upon analytically inadequate and strategically problematic conceptions of the state, innovation 
and their (developing) inter-relations.  
In this paper, we have used a CPERI approach that sees the state and innovation as co-produced 
social, political, economic and technical phenomena (Jasanoff 2004).  We first presented a critical 
analysis of the Green New Deal, in some of its dominant manifestations.  These Green Keynesian 
approaches presume that if existing processes and models of innovation were to receive stronger 
support from a newly nimble state and to focus on ecological sustainability, these latter issues could be 
resolved.  Amongst the Green New Deal discourses achieving greatest political purchase are those that 
champion the concept of the entrepreneurial state, while failing to problematize their understanding of 
innovation and the public good, as implied by the terms ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘state’ respectively.  
Innovation is thus accepted to mean high-technology innovation driven by venture capital investment, 
while it is taken for granted that (greater) state direction of innovation will serve a just and democratic 
public interest, almost by definition.  This, we have argued, also affords a wholly uncritical disavowal 
of the actual record of 20
th
 century Keynesianism, not least regarding the central issue of its ecological 
impact.  
In all these respects, however, a CPERI analysis – exploring the co-production of actual 
trajectories of socio-technical change and innovation policy in parallel with changing power relations 
and dominant imaginaries and common-senses – directly opens up these blindspots.  Placing these 
political narratives of innovation policy atop the existing political economic regime , we can see how, 
counter to much of the well-intentioned sentiment built into Green Keynesian proposals, incumbent 
power relations are not supportive of (and actively hostile to) a reversion to both the social democracy 
that accompanied mid-20
th
 century Keynesianism along with any social democratic framing of 
innovation. To the contrary, the resulting conceptions of a GND can lend credence to agendas that 
actually reinforce and revive the neoliberal growth machine (rising levels of resource consumption 
accompanying rising inequality), just in new, greener and more ‘innovative’ forms.  
Indeed, as seismic political events during the review process of this article have clearly 
demonstrated, this inimical twisting of Green Keynesianism is arguably one of the better possibilities 
today. In many ways, the election of Trump and the vote for Brexit confirm the foregoing argument. 
First, both signal a formidable populist resistance to any revived social democratic Keynesianism and 
its entrepreneurial state, making the grand visions of Green New Deal advocates seem more remote 
than ever.  
Yet, secondly, and somewhat ironically, these events signal a nostalgic thirst for a return to 
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(innovation and investment in the model of) the ‘good old days’ of Keynesian industrialism and the 
allure of full and life-long employment (for the white, male working class) – viz. ‘Make America Great 
Again’ or, indeed, ‘We want our country back’ for Brexit.  It is just that this vision is precisely not 
Keynesianism of a ‘green’ or low-carbon innovation, but rather one determined to rebuild the original, 
high-carbon variety, that caters to an industrial working class that feels as though it has been left behind 
(Chen, 2015). The (geo)politics required to preserve the financially and environmentally unsustainable 
‘carbon bubble’ (Steffen 2016) are apparently now being actively pursued (including now, Trump 
taking the US out of the global Paris Agreement on climate change), and are being bolstered by an 
attempt to destroy and censor all federal capacity to document the counter-narrative of worsening 
anthropogenic climate change.  As always, this is also being played out through the crucial arena of 
innovation policy and government support for socio-technical systems; in this case, of fossil fueled 
industrialism, not green innovation.  In this respect, then, the election of Trump may come to present a 
warped revival of ‘Keynesianism’ that is more politically and environmentally faithful to its historical 
referent than many of the idealistic and aspirational visions of Green Keynesianism.  
But Trump potentially represents even more of a challenge to Green Keynesianism, stealing not 
just their old, familiar clothes (an industrial, militarized state) but also their new ones, regarding the 
entrepreneurial state. For Silicon Valley not only remains a pre-eminent power center in determining 
the common-sense meaning of ‘innovation’ - as in fact self-styled ‘disruptive’ rentiership (Birch 2017) 
- but its tech scions have already shown themselves willing to work with the Trump administration 
(Coren 2016).   
Given that they are clearly opposed to Trump on some major issues (e.g. immigration), this 
suggests Big Tech spots clear opportunities in this populist, ‘entrepreneurial’, free-market and ill-
prepared administration to ‘disrupt Washington’ in a durable reframing of the state, further sedimenting 
their power to shape national innovation policy (Taplin 2017). Completing the disrobing of Green 
Keynesianism’s express intentions, therefore, the Trump presidency threatens to effect a Keynesian 
revival that achieves precisely the opposite: a regressive, high-carbon, chauvinistic new New Deal in 
parallel with an ‘entrepreneurial state’ that manifests an even-more-radical dismantling of the state by 
handing it over to quintessentially neoliberal, Randian ‘innovators’ (Cf Micklethwaite & Woolridge, 
2014).  
This dark prospect places a grave responsibility on STS to raise key issues of contemporary 
politics, in which the politics of innovation (in co-production with constantly evolving power relations) 
are so pivotal.  As STS scholars have made abundantly clear, technologies are not neutral, nor is the 
‘innovation’ that includes, but is not exhausted by, the introduction of new technologies. Which 
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innovations are produced, which technologies are maintained, and how, all matter deeply, and 
increasingly so in an age of proliferating socio-technical novelty, risk and uncertainty (Tyfield, 2015).  
One cannot just assume that technologies coming out of any given innovation ecosystem, let 
alone one dominated by Silicon Valley-funded ventures, are the ‘green’ or ‘clean’ or ‘smart’ 
technologies that will best serve the public interest, just as one cannot assume that greater state 
involvement in innovation necessarily ‘tames’ the private interests of capital in shaping sociotechnical 
trajectories. In other words, and to reframe this in environmental terms, we need to be asking: which 
‘green’ innovation will shape our cities, our transit, our energy supplies, and our food system, and 
which public will this serve and co-produce (Viitanen and Kingston, 2014; Tyfield et al., 2015)?  
We do not intend to inveigh here on the specifics of these debates, but wish merely to flag the 
necessity of having them, and of having them with as broadly relevant a ‘public’ as possible. Setting a 
socially-determined innovation agenda is central to defining what ‘progress’ can and should mean, who 
or what that progress will serve, and what sort of governing institutions can support these ends. As 
such, this is an agenda – for politics, research and their conjunction – that remains attentive to the 
constitutive relationality of innovation and state/politics, and how the latter is irreducibly shaped by the 
former.  
It may be that neither ‘reform’ nor ‘revolution’ offers a way forward, and that this framing itself 
may need to be rethought. Along these lines, we might ask: what would it look like to engage (existing) 
states without capitulating to them – to build the capacity to make collective decisions – to plan as 
states plan – while transforming the mechanisms of decision-making at every scale imaginable?  
Furthermore, what forms of ongoing socio-technical responses can and should be supported by these 
re-imagined political institutions, with what uneven effects upon a diverse, already-scarred socio-
ecological world? Ultimately, only an egalitarian and ecological politics of innovation, explicitly 
targeted at both concrete issues of socio-technical change and the longer-term co-produced parallel 
remodeling of political communities and institutions – including, crucially, the state –, has any strategic 
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